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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OB-
TAINED BY WIRE TAPPING
The United States Supreme Court was recently called upon to consider a novel
aspect of the problem of search and seizure and the admissibility of illegally obtained
evidence. Several persons had been convicted of a conspiracy to violate the National
Prohibition Act. The information which led to the discovery of the conspiracy and
its nature and extent was largely obtained by intercepting messages on the telephones
of the conspirators by four federal prohibition officers. The primary question con-
sidered by the Supreme Court was whether the use of such evidence of private tele-
phone conversations between the defendants and others, intercepted by means of
wire tapping by federal officers, amounted to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.,
It appeared that secret wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires
from the residences of four of the defendants and those leading from their chief
office. The insertions, however, were made without trespass upon any property of
the defendants, the taps being made in the basement of the office building and in the
streets near the residences.
By a five to four- decision the judgment of the Circuit Court ofAppeals upholding
conviction3 was affirmed, Mr. Chief Justice Taft writing the opinion of the Court.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated s"
The Fifth Amendment provides:
"No person ..... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."
By means of a long line of decisions' from 7"eeks v. United States down to the
present time the doctrine has become firmly established in our federal courts that
evidence illegally obtained by federal officers in violation of the constitutional rights
of an accused under the Fourth Amendment may not be used against him on trial.
In numerous decisionss the Court has asserted that to receive such evidence
1. Olmstead et al. v. United States (1928)-U. S.-, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed.-.
2. Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Butler, and Mr. JusticeStone
dissented.
3. Olmstead et al. v. United States (1927) C. C. A., 19 F. (2nd) 842.
4. Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U S 383 34S. Ct. 341, 58 L Ed. 652; Silver-
thorne Lumber Co., Inc., et al. v. United States (19205 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 181 64 L Ed.
319; Gouled v. United States (1921) 255 U S 298 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L Ed. 647; Amos v.
United States (1921) 255 U. S. 313, 41 S. Ct. 266, 65 L Ed. 654; Agnello et al v. United
States (1925) 269 U. S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145; Byars v. United States (1927) 273
U.S. 28, 47 S. Ct. 248, 71 L. Ed. 520; Gambino et al. v. United States (1927) 275 U. S.-,
48 S. Ct. 137, 72 L. Ed.; Marron v. United States (1927) 275 U. S. 182, 48 S. Ct.
74, 72 L. Ed.-.
5. Boyd v. United States (1886) 116 U. S. 616, 633-635, 6 S. Ct. 524,29 L. Ed, 746;
Gouled v. United States, supra, note 4, 255 U. S. 1. c. 306; Amos v. United States, supra,
note 4, 255 U. S. 1. c. 315-316; Agnello v. United States, supra, note 4, 269 U. S. L c. 33-34;
Marron v. United States, supra, note 4, 48.S. Ct. L c. 75.
6. This reason for exclusion has been frequently suggested; see e. g., Atkinson, "Ad-
missibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures" (1925) 25
Col. L. R. 11, 26-27;Note, "Admissibilityof Defendant's Property When Unlawfully Seized"(1922)" 10 Calif. L. R. 165, 167; Rowan, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained in Violation
of Constitutional Rights" (1924) 2 Tex. L. R. 208, 210; Editorial Note (1922) 26 Law Notes
82.
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would be to violate the provisions of the Fifth Amendment against compulsory self.
incrimination. Whether that be the only reason, or whether aside from the Fifth
Amendment it should be excluded as the only adequate means of giving effect to tile
Fourth Amendment,6 it is not necessary to discuss in this article. Suffice it to say
that the rule is well settled in the federal courts that such evidence is not admissible.
It may be conceded at the outset that the situation here involved does not come
within any literal interpretation of search and seizure. Mr. Justice Butler in his dissent,
however, asserts that "tapping the wires and listening in by the officers literally
constituted a search for evidence". 7 It is difficult to disagree with this assertion, as
no entrance upon the premises of the defendants for the purpose of finding and carry.
ing away some physical object would seem to be necessary to constitute a search.?-
But if it be conceded that technically there was no search and siezure, it must also be
conceded that no literal interpretation or technical application of the search and
seizure clause has been insisted upon by the Supreme Court. Instead, the Court
has repeatedly declared that the Amendment must receive a liberal construction to
the end that the liberty of the individual shall be protected.
In Gouled u. United States8, Mr. Justice Clarke, delivering the opinion of a
unanimous court and speaking of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, said;
"It has been repeatedly decided that these amendments should receive
a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual
depreciation' of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts
or by well intentioned, but mistakenly over-zealous, executive officers."
Later Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the full court in Byars v. United
States' and referring to the application of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
asserted:
....... the Court must be vigilant to scrutinize the attendant facts
with an eye to detect and a hand to prevent violations of the Constitution
by circuitous and indirect methods. Constitutional provisions for the security
of person and property are to be liberally construed, and 'it is the duty of courts
to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against stealthy
encroachments thereon'."
Statements of a similar tenor by the courts calling for a liberal rather than a
literal interpretation in dealing with these amendments might be multiplied."0
The rights guaranteed by these amendments are fundamental and declared by
the Court to be "indispensable to the full enjoyment of personal security, personal
liberty, and private property; ..... they are regarded as of the very essence of con-
stitutional liberty."" Such rights, it is recognized, must be equally enforced in
favor of the guilty and the innocent,2 and the fact that such enforcement may result
7. Supra, note 1, 48 S. Ct. I. c. 576.
7a. See Ex parte Jackson (1877) 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. Ed. 877, holding sealed matter
in the mails to be protected by this Fourth Amendment, and Boyd v. United States, sa-
pra note 7, holding that an order compelling production of private papers may operate as
an unreasonable search and seizure.
8. Supra, note 4, 255 U.S. I. c. 304. (Italics the writer's.)
9. Supra, note 4,273 U. S. I. c. 32. (Italics the writer's.)
10. Boyd v. United States, supra, note 5, 116 U. S. 1. c. 635; In rc Lobosco (1926)
11 F. (2d) 892, 894; Wallace v. State (1927) 157 N. E. 657, 660,-Ind.-; Flum v. State (1924)
193 Ind. 585, 590, 143 N. E. 353; Kalwin Business Men's Ass'n. v. McLaughlin (1926)
214 N. Y. S. 507, 511, 216 App. Div. 6.
11. Mr. Justice Clarke in Gouled v. United States, supra, note 4, 255 U. S. 1. e. 304.
12. Byars v. United States, supra, note 4, 273 U. S. 1. c. 29; Agnello v. United States,
supra, note4, 269 U. S... c. 32; Kirvin v. United States (1924) C. C. A. , 5 F. (2d) 282, 285;
Atlantic Food Products Co. v. McClure (1922) 288 F. 982, 984; Ashbrook v. State (1923)
92 Okla. 287, 288-289, 219 P. 347.
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in defeating the enforcement of the prohibition law in a particular case is immaterial
as the constitutional provisions are paramount.13
Half a century ago the Supreme Court decided in Ex pare Jackson" that sealed
matter in the mails was under the protection of the Fourth Amendment and could be
opened only with a valid search warrant. Any literal interpretation or narrow appli-
cation of the Fourth Amendment would not appear to include letters in the mails,
yet the soundness of that decision stands unquestioned.
In Boyd v. United States is the statute of 1874 authorizing an order in revenue
cases requiring defendant or claimant to produce his private papers, books and invoices
or else the allegations of the govenment attorney be taken as confessed, was held
to violate the Fourth Amendment. Yet the facts in that case, so much relied on in
the later development of our law of search and seizure, and which has been recently
reaffirmed by our Supreme Court,16 did not come within any literal interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment. The Court admitted in the Boyd case that technically there
was no search and seizure but held that an act which operated with the same effect
and served the same purpose as an illegal search and seizure offended against the
Fourth Amendment, when they said:
"It is our opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of a man's
private papers to establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his proper-
ty, is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in all
cases in which a search and seizure would be; because it ..... effects the sole object
and purpose of search and seizure."17
Again in the same opinion, speaking of the statute involved and the infor-
mation in the case, the Court said:
.....we have to deal with an act which expressly excludes criminal proceed-
ings from its operation (though embracing civil suits for penalties and forfeitures),
and with an information not technically a criminal proceeding and neither,
therefore, within the literal terms of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
any more than it is within the literal terms of the Fourth. Does this relieve the
proceedings or the law from being obnoxious to the prohibitions of either? We
think not; we think they are within the spirit of both."' B
The Court said in the same case, speaking of Lord Camden's opinion in Entick
v. Carrington," upon which the whole law of search and seizure is so largely based:
"The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of consti-
tutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the
case there before the court; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government
and its employees of the sanctities of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is
not the breaking of his doors, and the rumaging of his drawers, that constitutes
the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
13. United States v. Bookbinder (1922) 278 F. 216, 218; State v. Jokosh (1923) 181
Wis. 160, 163, 193 N. NV. 976; Bruner v. Commonwealth (1921) 192 Ky. 386, 388, 233 S. WI,.
795.
14. (1877) 96 U. S. 727, 733-735, 24 L. Ed. 877; Hoover v. M'Chesney (1897) C. C., 81
F. 472, 481 et seq.
15. Supra, note 7,116 U. S..1 c. 621-622.
16. Byars v. United States, supra, note 4,273 U. S. 1. c. 249; Gouled v. United States,
supra, note 4,255 U. S. Lc. 306.
17. Supra, note 5, 116 U. S. Lc. 622. (Italics the writer's)
18. Supra, note5,116 U.S.I c. 633.
19. (1765) 19 Howell's State Trials, 1029.
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security, personal liberty and private property where that right has never been
forfeited by his conviction of some public offense ..... " 20
It is submitted that "the sanctities of a man's home and the privacies of life"
and "the indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property'
are as seriously invaded in the principal case as in Boyd v. United States or Ex parte
Jackson.
Sincesealed matterin the mail is under the protection of the Fourth Amendment,
an officer who, without proper warrant, opened and read a letter would not be per-
mitted to testify to its contents. 21 Yet, is the surreptitious reading of a letter by a
federal officer and later testifying to its contents so materially different from, in
like manner, surreptitiously listening, by means of his own illegal tapping, to the
transmission of a similar message by telephone and later testifying to the contents of
the message, as to make the latter a proper matter of evidence while the former is
protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments?
The majority opinion in the principal case emphasizes the fact that there is
"no evidence of compulsion to induce the defendants to talk over their many
telephones. They were continuously and voluntarily transacting business without
knowledge of the interception."22 How much different is this from the voluntary
sending of letters through the mails, wrongfully and illegally intercepted, as here,
opened and read, and then senton to the addressee, and an attempt made to have the
intercepting officer testify to the contents? True the physical letter is taken possession
of for the time being, while no physical evidence is so taken into the possession of
the officer in the principal case. But it is the contents of the message, not the mere
paper upon which the letter is written, that is protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Could it be successfully contended that a letter which was read by means o
some device without breaking the seal would not be protected? If it would be pro-
tected would not that case be sufficiently analogous to that of a telephone communi-
cation to place the two in the same category?
Judge Rudkin, dissenting from the judgment affirming the conviction below,
asks:
"What is the distinction between a message sent by letter and one sent
by telegraph or telephone?" "True," he says, "the one is visible, the other
invisible; the one tangible, the other intangible; the one sealed, the other
unsealed; but these are distinctions without a difference." 23
"The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater
than that involved in tampering with the mails. Whenever a telephone line is
tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded, and all
conversations between them upon any subject, altho proper, confidential, and
privileged, may be overheard. As a means of espionage, writs of assistance
and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when
compared with wire tapping."21
The Fourth' Amendment should be so construed as to prohibit effectively the
type of evil which it must have been the purpose of the framers to prevent, rather
20. Boyd v. United States, supra, note 5, 116 U. S. 1. c. 630 (Italics the writer's)
21. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra, note 4, 251 U. S. 1. c. 392;
Watson v. United States (1925) C. C. A., 6 F. (2d) 870, 871; United States v. Dziatlus (1923)
289 F. 837, 843; United States v. Lydecker (1921) 275 F. 976, 980; Flagg v. United States(1916) 147 C. C. A. 367, 233 F. 481, 483 et seq; White v. Commonwealth (1927) 221 Ky.
535, 537-538, 299 S. W. 168.
22. Supra, note 1, 48 S. Ct. 1. c. 567.
23. Olmstead et al. v. United States, supra, note 3, 19 F. (2d) I. c. 850.
24. Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent, 48 S. Ct. 1. c. 571.
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than that it be restricted in its application to those acts of governmental oppression
which had created a demand for the constitutional guaranty, or which a literal con-
struction of the words therein would embrace. It is because the Court has given
effect to the broader purposes of the Amendment rather than the literal meaning of
its words that Ex parte Jackson and the Boyd case were brought within the scope of
its protection.
Gouled v. United States 25 is justified and distinguished by the Court on the
ground that there had been an "actual entrance into the private quarters of the
defendant", which is shown by the Boyd-26 case not to be essential, "and the taking
away of something tangible."27 But is the difference between tangible and intangible
to control? If instead of carrying away the tangible papers there had been an attempt
to produce testimony as to what had been observed to be the contents of such papers,
that likewise should have been excluded.28
The issuance of a subpoena duces tecum for the production of papers, not unduly
sweeping in its terms, and compelling obedience thereto, does not constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure." Yet in Siluerthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,30
where the tangible evidence illegally seized had been returned and it was sought to
compel its production, the Court held, even in the case of a corporation which cannot
claim the benefit of the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment,31 that the Fourth Amendment afforded protection, and that evidence
cannot be thus secured and used where the information upon the basis of which the
subpoena was issued was obtained by the wrongful act of government officers in
violation of constitutional rights. 32
A warrant issued solely for the purpose of securing evidence, and not to seize
some property which the government has a right to take and which is unlawfully or
wrongfully possessed by the individual, is void, and any such search and seizure, with
25. Supra, note 4, 255 U. S. 298. Here a representative of the Intellignce Department
of the Army, pretending to make a friendly call, gained admission to defendant's office
and secretly abstracted certain papers which were later sought to be used in evidence.
26. In the Boyd case an order to produce papers under a statute requiring the defend-
ant to so produce or the allegations of the government attorney be taken as confessed was
held to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
27. Supra, note 1, 48 S. Ct. 1. c. 567.
28. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra, note 4, 251 U. S. L c.
392; In re Oryell (1928) 28 F (2d) 639, 640; Watson v. United States, supra note 21, 6
F. (2d) 1. c. 871; United States v. Dziadus,supra, note 21, 289 F. I.c. 843; United States
v. Lydecker, supra, note 21, 275 F. 1. c. 980; Flagg v. United States, supra, note 21, 233 F.
1. c. 483 Ct seq.; White v. Commonwealth, supra, note 21, 221 Ky. L c. 537.
29. Brown v. U. S. (1928)-U. e-, 48 Ct.9"88 290,72 1. E.-; Wheeler v. United
States (1913) 226 U. S. 478, 489, 33 5. Ct. 15i, 57L. N.309; Consolidated Rendering Co.
v. Vermont (1908) 207 U. S. 541, 553-554, 28 S. Ct. 178, 52 L. Ed. 327. But if too sweeping
in its terms it may violate the Fourth Amendment Hale v. Henkel (1906) 201 U. S. 43,
76-772, 26 S. Ct. 3702, 50 L. Ed. 652.
30. Supra, note 4, 251 U. 5. 1. c. 392.
31. Esgee Co. of China v. United States (1923) 262 U.S . 151, 155-156,43 . Ct. 514,
67 L. Ed. 917; Wheeler v. United States, supra, note 29, 226 U. S. I.e. 489, 490; Wilson V.
United States (1911) 221 U. S. 361, 382-)383, 31 S. Ct. 538, 55 L. Ed. 771; American Litho-.
graphic Co. v. Werckmesster (1911) 221 U. S. 603, 611, 31 S Ct. 676 55 L. Ed. 573; Balti-
more & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm ission (1911) 221 U. S. 61,
622, 31 5. Ct. 621, 55 L. Ed. 878; Hale v. Henkel, supra, note 29, 201 U. S. . c. 74, 75;
State ex inf. Hadley, Attorney-General, v. Standard Oil Co. (1909) 218 Mo. 1, 375, 376, 116
S. W. 902.
32. For similar holding where search warrant is based on information illegally obtained,
see White v. Commonwealth (1927) 221 Ky. 535, 537-538, 299 S. W. 168.
33. Gouled v. United States, supra, note 4, 255 U. S. 1. c. 309; Boyd v. United States,
supra, note 5, 116 U. S. 1. c. 623, 624; Kirvin v. United States, supra, note 12, 5F. (2d) 1. c.
285; Veeder v. United States (1918) 164 C. C. A. 338, 252 F. 414,418.
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or without a warrant would be unreasonable and illegal. 33 The purpose served by tile
officers in the tapping of wires is identical. While not technically a search and seizure
it is an unreasonable and illegal interference with the individual's privacy and should
be condemned for the same reason that a search and seizure purely for evidence
purposes is held to be unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits only such searches as are unreasonable, but
leaves us to rely upon the principles of the common law for a determination of what
constitutes an unreasonable search.34 According to Judge Sims in McClannan v.
Chaplain, "an unreasonable search at common law is a search which is unreasonably
oppressive in its general invasion of the liberty of the citizen. What is a reasonable
or an unreasonable search or seizure at common law is purely a judicial question,
and in determining it the court must look to all the circumstances."85 As new sit-
uations may arise with the passage of time and changing conditions, which might
constitute unreasonable searches in the light of the principles of the common law,
so the guaranty in our Constitution, whose necessity was no doubt suggested by the
evils of general warrants and writs of assistance, must be held to include situations
not considered by the framers of the Amendment. "The meaning of constitutional
guaranties never varies, but the scope of their application must expand or contract
to meet new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field
of their operation."'36 "In the application of a constitution ................ our contempla-
tion cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. "37 The principle involved
in the application of constitutional provisions to new conditions was tersely stated
by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall when he said, "We must never forget that it is a con-
stitution we are expounding."'38
Acting upon the principle thus asserted the Court has continued to sanction
the exercise of power by Congress as applied to objects and conditions which could
not have been in the minds of those who framed and adopted our Constitution,2 and
has construed limitations either on the federal government or the states so as to per-
mit the enforcement of statutes which at an earlier time and under different condi-
tions would have been "rejected as arbitrary and oppressive."40
"Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses
of power must have a similar adaptation to a changing world." 41
The Fifth Amendment has ever been given a broad and liberal interpretation
in accord with the above general principle. It has been held to apply alike to a party
or a mere witness, in civil as well as in criminal cases, in all manner of proceedings in
which testimony is taken, in all methods of interrogaton before a court, in investi-
gations before a grand jury, and in investigations by a legislature or a body having
legislative functions.42
34. People v. Chiagles (1923) 237 N. Y. 193, 195, 142 N. E. 583.35. (1923) 136 Va. 1, 14-17, 116 S. E. 495; Agnello v. United States (1923) 290 F. 671
682; Mason v. Rollins (1869) 16 Fed. Cas. 1061, 1063, Fed. Case No. 9252 2 Biss. 99.
36. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926) 272 U. S. 365,387,47 S. at. 114, 71 L.
Ed. 303; Fowler v. Obier (1928)-Ky.-, 7 S. W. (2d) 219, 225.
37. Weems v. United States (1910) 217 U. S. 349, 373, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54 L. Ed. 793.
38. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 407, 4 L. Ed. 579.
39. Brooks v. United States (1925) 267 U. S. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345, 69 L. Ed. 699; Dakota
Central Telephone Co. v. South Dakota (1919) 250 U. S. 163, 39 S. Ct. 507, 63 L. Ed. 910;
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota (1919) 250 U. S. 135, 39 S. Ct. 502, 63 L. Ed. 897;
Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1877) 96 U. S. 1, 9,24 L. Ed. 708.
40. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra, note 35, 272 U. S. 1. c. 387.
41. Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent, 48 S. Ct. 570.
42. Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., vol 4, p. 835, sec. 2252; McCarthy v. Arndstcin (1924)
266 U. S. 34, 40,45 S. Ct. 16, 69 L. Ed. 158; Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892) 142 U. S. 547,
562, 12 S. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110.
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In view of the past decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with constitutional
limitations upon the powers of government and with guaranties of the liberty of the
individual, it may be asserted that it has been the purpose of the Court to give
to constitutional provisions, in the light of changed conditions and circumstances,
that interpretation and application which will render them effective to serve the
general purpose intended by the framers. The Fourth Amendment was framed and
adopted as a means of protecting the individual against the evils of government offi-
cials prying into his private affairs in an unreasonable and oppressive manner. Par-
ticularly was the use of general warrants and writs of assistance intended to be for-
bidden. But was it not also within the intention of the framers to provide a protec-
tion for the privacy of the individual against such other practices as might be employ-
ed by the government, whose effect is to violate in similar fashion the individual's
right of privacy, liberty, and personal security? If it is true that "subtler and more
far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the government"' ,
than those contemplated by the framers of the Amendment-and that cannot be de-
nied-was it not the purpose of the framers to effectuate a protection against them
also?
Consistent with the intended purposes of the Amendment and the liberal
interpretation of the Constitution in general and the Fourth Amendment in partic-
ular, it is submitted that the position of the dissenting judges in the principal case
represents the logical application of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to a set of
conditions which could not have been within the contemplation of the framers but
which is so closely akin to the evils intended to be guarded against as to be properly
held to come within their prohibition.
The fact that the officers in question violated a criminal statute of the State of
Washington 4 is not material to the question of admissibility of the evidence under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Yet it is a significant fact, indicative of the atti-
tude of the public and of the state and federal governments toward such snooping
activities, that twenty-six states45 have made it a crime to intercept a message sent
by telephone or telegraph, and thirty-five states 45 have made it a criminal offense
for a company engaged in the transmission of such messages or its employees to
43. Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent, 48 S. Ct. 1. c. 570.
44. Remington's Compiled Statutes of State of Washington, (1922) sec. 2656 (18).
45. Alabama, Code (1923) sec. 5256; Arizona, R. S. (1913) Penal Code, sec. 692;
Arkansas, Crawford and Moses' Digest (1921) sec. 10246; California, Deering's Penal Code
(1927) sec. 640; Colorado, Compiled Laws (1921) sec. 6969; Connecticut, General Statutes(1918) sec. 6292; Idaho, Compiled Statutes (1919) secs. 8574, 8586; Illinois, R. S. (1927)
c. 134, sec. 16; Iowa, Code (1927) sec. 13121; Kansas, R. S. (1923) c. 17 sec. 1908; Michigan
Compiled Laws (1915) sec. 15403; Montana, Penal Code (1921) sec. 11?18; Nebraska, Com-
piled Statutes (1922) sec. 7115; Nevada, R. L. (1912) sees. 4608, 6752 (18); New York,
Cahils Consolidated Laws (1923) c. 41, sec. 1423 (6); North Dakota, Compiled Laws
(1913) sec. 10231; Ohio, Page's General Code (1926) sec. 13402; Oklahoma, Compiled Statutes
Annotated, 1926 Supplement, c. 6, Art. 41, sec. 2229; Oregon, Olson's Laws (1920) sec. 2265;
South Dakota, Revised Code (1919) sec. 4312; Tennessee, Shannon's Code (1917) seas.
1839, 1840; Utah, Compiled Laws (1917) sec. 8433; Virginia, Code (1924) sec. 4477 (2);
Washington, Remington's Compiled Statutes (1922) sec. 2556 (18); Wisconsin, Statutes
(1927) c. 348, sec. 348.37; Wyoming, Compiled Statutes (1920) sec. 7148. Statutes collected
by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissent, 48 S. Ct. 1. c. 573.
46. Alabama, Code (1923) seas. 5543, 5545; Arizona, R. S. (1913) Penal Code, seas.
621, 623, 691; Arkansas, Crawford & Moses' Digest (1921) sec. 10250; California, Deering's
Penal Code (1927) secs. 619, 621, 639, 641; Colorado, Compiled Laws (1921) secs. 6966
6968, 6970; Connecticut, GeneralStatutes (1918) sec. 6292; Florida, Revised GeneralStatutes(1920) seas. 5754, 5755; Idaho, Compiled Statutes (1919) sees, 8568, 8570; Illinois, R. S.
(1927) c. 134, seas. 7, 7a; Indiana, Burns' R. S. (1926) sec. 2862; Iowa, Code(1924) sec. 8305;
Louisiana, Acts (1918) Act No. 134, p. 228; Maine, R. S. (1916) c-60, sec. 24; Maryland, Bag-
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disclose them, while Congress by Act of 1918, 4 applicable during the period of feder-
al control, made it criminal to tap telephone or telegraph wires, or disclose the con-
tents of any message to persons not authorized to receive the same.
The government, in the principal case, was forced to rely entirely for conviction
upon the evidence obtained by wire tapping and expose the criminal conduct of its
own officers, acting on behalf of the government, in obtaining the evidence for the
sole purpose of using it to convict the defendants of a crime that pales into insignifi.
cance when compared with the blow to the very foundations of civil liberty itself
struck by those same officers in invading the privacy of the defendants.
Certainly the Court must have a choice to refuse to become, or permit the govern-
ment to become, a party to the crime committed by these officers by appearing tj
ratify it, as must be true if they make use of such evidence, the mere production of
which reveals the crime by which it was officially obtained. The government is as one
pointing a finger of disapproval at the act of the officers, denying any authorization
and refusing to accept responsibility for such conduct, and at the same time reaching
out a hand and dragging in the spoils of the crime and making them its own, telling
the officers that, athought their conduct is disapproved, any evidence obtained in
the future by similar crimes on their part will be accepted by the Court and used in
the same manner.
If the federal government, by accepting evidence of violation of the Volstead
Act secured by state troopers without a warrant in a state where no other statute
was violated, was so ratifying the wrongful acts of the troopers as to make them its
own to the extent that to use such evidence would violate the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, 48 it is more clearly a ratification so as to make the government a
party thereto where, as in the principal case, it is accepting, paying for, and using
such evidence illegally obtained by the criminal acts of its own officers.
If it were plausible to argue, with Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmes
in their dissent in Burdeau v. McDowell," that the using of evidence obtained by
the theft of a private individual, thus appearing to put the Court's stamp of approval
upon such conduct, would not promote respect for law because it constituted a
resort,"in its enforcement, to means which shock the common man's sense of decency
and fair play", what must be the effect of such a decision as that in the principal
case? The ordinary layman cannot view such a proceeding in any other light than as
an act by the government, through its officers, committing a deliberate crime and
an outrage against the fundamental rights of the citizen for the very purpose of
inflicting punishment upon him whose rights have thus been violated. The govern-
ment, by placing thereon it final stamp of approval through its highest court, becomes
a party thereto. This, at a time when a waning respect for law and the courts is
widely viewed as a problem of serious proportions, it can ill afford to do.
by's Code (1926) art. 27, sec. 489; Michigan, Compiled Statutes (1915) sec. 15104; Minne-
sota, General Statutes (1923) secs. 10423, 10424; Mississippi, Hemmingwa is Code (1927)
sec. 1774; Missouri, R. S. (1919) sec. 3605; Montana, Penal C ode (1921) sec. 11494; Nebraska
Compiled Statutes (1922) sec. 7088; Nevada, Revised Laws (1912) sees. 4603, 4605 4609,
4631; New Jersey, Compiled Statutes (1910) pp. 5319-5320, secs. 12, 13; New York, dahill's
Consolidated Laws (1923) c. 41, sees. 552, 553; North Carolina, Consolidated Statutes (1919)
secs. 4497, 4498, 4499; North Dakota, Compiled Laws (1913) sec. 10078; Ohio, Page's
General Code (1926) secs. 13388, 13419; Oklahoma, Compiled Statutes Annotated, 1926
Supplement, c. 6, art. 41, sec. 2256; Oregon, Olson's Laws (1920) secs. 2260, 2262, 2266;
Pennsylvania, Statutes (1920) secs. 6306, 6308, 6309; Rhode Island, General Laws (1923)
sec. 6104; South Dakota, Revised Code (1919) secs. 4346, 9801; Tennessee, Shannon's Code(1917) secs. 1837, 1838; Utah, Compiled Laws (1917) secs. 8403, 8405, 8434; Washington,
Pierce's Code t1921) secs. 8982, 8983; Wisconsin, Statutes (1927) c. 348, sec. 348.36, 348.361.
Statutes collected by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissent, 48 S. Ct. 1. c. 573.
47. C. 197; 40 Statutes 1017; Compiled Statutes, 1919 Suplement, sec. 3115 4 XX.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED DY WIRE TAPPING
A court will, in proper cases,50 recognize a defense of entrapment at the hands
of public officials and refuse to convict, not because of the absence of a criminal in-
tent but in cases where no criminal intent need be shown,51 and not because the
government has, by its officers, consented to the crime,, but because it is deemed
good policy to do so. In such cases the court is unwilling to make itself a party to
any such wrongful conduct, believing that respect for law and its effective adminis-
tration will be hindered rather than helped by appearing to sanction such wrongful
acts. So in the principal case, it would have been sound policy on the part of the
Court to have excluded the evidence,-5 by means of which respect for law and the
courts, and ultimate law enforcemeni would have been better served.
University of Missouri School of Law Robert L. Howard.
48. Gambino v. United States, supra, note 4, 48 S. Ct. L c. 138. This case arose in
New York. The acts in question took place after repeal of the state prohibition enforcement
law and the state troopers secured the evidence for the purpose of turning it over to federal
officers. For other cases of ratification see Dodge v. United States (1926) 272 U. S. 530, 531,
532, 47 S. Ct. 191, 71 L. Ed. 392; O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke (1908) 209 U. S. 45, 52,
28 S. Ct. 439, 52 L. Ed. 676; The Paquete Habana (1903) 189 U. S. 453, 464-465, 23 S. Ct.
593, 47 L. Ed. 900; Taylor v. United States 1844) 3 How. 197, 205-206, 11 L. Ed. 559;
Wood v. United States (1842) 16 Pet. 342, 359, 10 L Ed. 987; The Caledonian (1819) 4
Wheat. 100, 103, 4 L. Ed. 523.
49. (1921) 256 U. S. 465, 477, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed. 1048.
50. Gargano et al v. United States (1928) C C.A. 14 F. (2d) 625, 626; Cline v. United
States (1927) C. C. A., 20 F. (2d) 494, 495-496; Silk v. United States (1926) C. C. A., 16 F.(2d) 568, 570; Capuano v. Unitid States (1925) C. C. A., 9 F. (2d) 41, 42-43; Newman v.
United States (1924) C. C. A., 299 F. 128, 131; Ritter v. United States (1923) C. C. A.,
293 F. 187, 189; United States v. Certain Quantities of Intoxicating Liquors (1923) 290 F.
824, 826-827; Butts v. United States (1921) C. C. A., 273 F. 35, 37-38; United States v.
Lynch (1918) 256 F. 983 984-985; Peters v. United States (1919) 166 C. C. A. 509, 255 F.
433; United States v. Ecfiols (1918) 253 F. 862; Voves v. United States (1918) 161 C. C. A.
227, 249 F. 191, 192; Sam Yick v. United States (1917) 153 C. C. A. 96, 240 F. 60, 65; Woo
Wai v. United States (1915) 137 C. C. A. 604,223 F. 412, 415; United States v. Hcaly (1913)
202 F. 349, 350; United States v. Adams (1894) 59 F. 674, 677.
51. Voves v. United States, supra, note 50, 249 F. 191; United States v. Healy,
supra, note 50, 202 F. 1. c. 350.
52. People v. Mills (1904) 178 N. Y. 274, 70 N. E. 786; Bishop, Criminal Law, 9th
Ed., vol. 1, sec. 926y.
53. The court asserts in the principal case (p. 569) that the courts have no discretion
to exclude evidence in such a situation, the admission of which is not unconstitutional. Itis
submitted, however, that it was largely a matter of choice of policy that determined the
exclusion of the evidence in the Silverthorne Lumber Co. case (supra, note 30) and the Gam.
bino case (supra, note 48). For instances of state courts using their discretion to exclude, as
matter of policy, evidence illegally obtained by federal officers, see State v. Rebasti (1924)
306 Mo. 336, 346 et seq., 267 S. W. 858; State v. Horton (1925) 312 Mo. 202, 207, 278 S. W.
661; Walters v. Commonwealth (1923) 199 Ky. 182, 186-187,250 S.W. 839; Vick v. Common-
wealth (1924) 204 Ky. 513, 264 S. W. 1079; Roberts v. Commonwealth (1924) 206 Ky. 75,
76, 266 S. W. 880. The Court might reach the same result, by way of analogy to the entrap-
ment cases, by refusing to convict where to do so would make it, in effect, a party to the crime
by which the only evidence of guilt was obtained.
